Assessing Zera Yacob’s Relationship to the Enlightenment

Abstract: In recent years the seventeenth century Ethiopian philosopher Zera Yacob has been championed as a modern rationalist philosopher and forerunner of human rights, whose work uniquely pre-empted concepts traditionally attributed to European Enlightenment figures such as Locke, Descartes, Hume, and Kant. This interpretation of Yacob has proved particularly useful to scholars arguing for the recognition of Ethiopia’s indigenous philosophical tradition in reaction to historical Eurocentrism. In contrast, Belayneh Girma (2017), argues that Yacob’s reputation as an Enlightenment rationalist has no credible basis, a provocative dissent which does not appear to have been engaged in the literature. This article examines scholarly claims for both Yacob’s apparently unique philosophical contributions and his relationship to the Enlightenment, using both an original assessment of Yacob’s work, and application of Belayneh’s critique. It concludes that despite being an innovator in his own environment, and despite his intellectual independence from the European philosophical tradition, Yacob was neither a precursor to, nor a participant in, the distinctively rationalist continuum of Enlightenment thought.

Key words: Africana philosophy, Enlightenment, Zera Yacob, Hatata, human rights

Introduction

Bonny Ibhawoh (2017), has noted “resurgent interest in the seventeenth century Ethiopian philosopher and thinker, Zera Yacob”, citing an online article by Dag Herbjørnsrud (2017), which raised the profile of Zera Yacob in the public consciousness.

Herbjørnsrud’s characterization of Yacob as a precursor of the European Enlightenment has some support from previous scholarship, in particular Teshome Abera (2016), Fasil Merawi (2017), Bonny Ibhawoh (2017), and Teodros Kiros (2017), and has been championed in non-scholarly commentary in the public arena by Kush Fanikiso (2018), and Tatenda Gwaambuka (2018). However, Belayneh Girma has rejected this interpretation of Yacob, arguing that his philosophy has no intellectual continuity with the Enlightenment and that Yacob himself was not even a rationalist (Belayneh 2017).

Despite being expressed by Belayneh in very strong terms, his reading of Yacob is less a reflexive backlash against over-exaggerated depictions of the philosopher, and more a return to earlier assessments. In fact Belayneh’s position is quite close to the view held by Claude Sumner (1999), whose 1976 English translation of and commentary on Yacob’s seminal work “Hatata” (Meditations), brought Yacob to the attention of broader Anglophone philosophical scholarship. Nevertheless, Belayneh’s work appears to have passed without comment in the literature.

This article compares the claims and evidence in Herbjørnsrud’s article and recent scholarly literature, with both Belayneh’s critiques and an original assessment of Yacob’s work. It concludes that Belayneh’s argument is a useful corrective to recent assessments of Yacob’s philosophical contributions.

Yacob as original thinker

Yacob is typically characterized as a highly independent and original thinker. Fasil Merawi (2017, 1), says he developed “a unique indigenous philosophy”. Teodros Kiros (1994, 9), says “His reflections on human nature are equally original”. Sumner (2004, 174, 179), likewise wrote “Zera Yacob’s philosophy is an absolutely original work”, claiming “from an intellectual viewpoint, Zara Yacob was a dove, free and independent”.

Such assessments make little to no acknowledgement of Yacob’s complex intellectual background and inheritance. An examination of his own work, together with his socio-historical context, demonstrates that many of the ideas credited to him as original or independent were in fact derived from a range of influences he experienced during his early education. The most direct textual influences on Yacob’s thinking include a large body of sapiential literature known as the Book of the Wise Philosophers, and the Christian Bible and traditional interpretations of it.

The Book of the Wise Philosophers is a collection of overwhelmingly Greek philosophical writings translated into Geez by the Egyptian Coptic priest Abba Mikael in 1510 (Sumner 1998, 443). This work covers a wide range of Greek philosophy (“Pre-Socratic, Socratic, Aristotelian, but especially Platonic and Neo-Platonic”, Sumner 1999, 173), as well as the writings of various Christian leaders. The influence of these philosophical works on Yacob is noticeable in several ways. His views on human relationships “resound with those of Plato and Aristotle” (Sicoli and Biller 2009, 54). Teodros (1994, 2), identifies Yacob as “More like the Greek philosophers” than like Descartes, and cites “his insistence like Aristotle before him, that marriage is part of the ontology of being”. Similarly, Yacob’s argument for the existence of God is distinctly Aristotelian in its articulation of a necessary prime mover; “there needs to be one essence, that existed before all creatures, without beginning or end, that created from nothing all that is dense and thin, visible and invisible” (Sumner 1976, 29).

Yacob’s personal philosophy was also deeply influenced by Christian writings. He records that he spent ten years at a school “to study the interpretation of the Holy Scriptures” (Sumner 1976, 4), including the interpretations of both foreign Catholic scholars and the interpretations of Ethiopian Coptic scholars. Consequently, Yacob would have had a comprehensive knowledge of earlier Christian thought and commentary on the Bible. He would certainly have been familiar with the writings of famous and influential early Christian writers and leaders who were born in North Africa, such as Tertullian and Cyprian in Carthage, Cyril, Origen, and Athanasius in Alexandria of Egypt, and Augustine in Numidia.

Even though he made great efforts to scrutinize critically the Christian teachings he had learned, and explicitly rejected some of them, it is still possible to detect a Christian foundation in his philosophy, and even some of the conclusions he represents as his original thought, can be found in the Bible or in the writings of earlier Christian scholars he would have read and studied. Sumner (1999, 177), notes “his thought had deep roots in the traditional theology of Ethiopia, especially in the Psalms, and in the critical approach of the qene school”.

There are many explicit citations of the Christian Bible in Yacob’s work, and he often justifies his conclusions by borrowing statements from Scripture, even without identifying the source. When describing husband and wife as “equal in marriage”, he provides the justification “for they are one flesh and one life” (Sumner 1976, 21), a direct quotation from the Bible (Genesis 1:23). In the same way, when he writes “as they used to say, “It is not good for man to live alone; a wife should be given him”” (Sumner 1976, 20), he is quoting Genesis 2:18.

There are also times when Yacob quotes a statement from the Bible, but represents it as the product of his personal reason. For instance, when Yacob writes “Moreover our reason says: Do not do unto others that which you do not like to be done to you, but do unto others as you would like others to do unto you” (Sumner 1976, 14), it is clear that he is quoting directly from Matthew 7:12 and Luke 6:31 (cf. Leviticus 9:18, 34). Yacob thus takes a maxim he learned in his theological education and represents it instead as the independent conclusion of his personal reason, possibly without even realising.

The origin of Yacob’s skepticism can also be found in his social background and formal education. Sumner (1999, 182), cites Turayev’s description of “the historical circumstances that were favourable to the appearance of rationalism in Ethiopia in the seventeenth century”, while Fasil (2017, 1), notes “Zera Yacob’s philosophy originated in the context of religious controversies and disputes”. Sumner (1999, 174–5), further observes that Yacob “attended the traditional schools of Ethiopia”, including the zema (sacred music), qene (poetry or hymns), and sawasewa (interpretation of the Bible). According to Summer (1999, 175), at the time of Yacob’s education there were a number of active disputes in the qene school, including “the existence of God and the respect due to Him, ridicule at the wings and protection of angels, denial of the divine origin of the ‘founders of religion’, and scepticism about the sinfulness of homicide”. Yacob’s skepticism was thus not sui generis, but a product of his time; he was actually educated in an environment of significant theological skepticism which even challenged the existence of God.

The influence of these disputes is clearly visible in Yacob’s own writings, as he questions the existence of God (“Whom am I praying to, or is there a God who listens to me?”, Sumner 1976, 6), the accuracy of the Bible (“Is everything written in the Holy Scriptures true”, Sumner 1976, 7), the divine origin of religious founders (“we know that the teachings of Mohammed could not come from God”, Sumner 1976,9), and various Christian traditions (“The law of Christians which propounds the superiority of monastic life over marriage is false and cannot come from God”, Sumner 1976, 9). Yacob’s own skepticism therefore was not the independent product of his own reasoning, but an extension of the skeptical influences of the education he had received in his youth.

Yacob as forerunner of human rights

Yacob has been described as an innovator of human rights, who espoused a number of progressive ideals before they were arrived at in the West. His attitudes to women and slavery are typically cited in this regard. Teodros (2005, 24), claims “He was the first to think about women’s rights in modern Ethiopia, perhaps even in the world”. Herbjørnsrud (2017), writes “Yacob is also more enlightened than his Enlightenment peers when it comes to slavery”, and Bonny (2017), speaks of Yacob’s “ground-breaking liberal ideas”, including his Hatata in a list of works which have “shaped the modern human rights movement”.

Broad generalizations of this kind are inevitably easier to assert than to support, and in this case there is overwhelming evidence against them. Yacob’s views on slavery and on women in marriage were more progressive than those of his Ethiopian contemporaries, but his views were not original or unique. In seventeenth century Europe, where even more progressive views had long been established, Yacob’s views would have been considered unremarkable at best and conservative at worst.

Though there is little evidence for Yacob’s attitude towards women in general, there is evidence that he considered a woman to be the equal of her husband. Yacob sought to marry a woman called Hirut, a servant of his patron. Herbjørnsrud (2017), erroneously claims that “Yacob argued with her master, who did not think a servant woman was equal to an educated man, but Yacob prevailed”, but Yacob says his patron acquiesced immediately, saying “Hereafter she is not my maidservant, but yours”, and “You are a man of God, do as you wish” (Sumner 1976, 20, 21). Yacob responded “I do not wish her to be my maidservant, but my wife; we should not call them master and maidservant” (Sumner 1976, 20–21), and asked for Hirut’s consent to marriage. Such statements indicate that he really did see her as an equal.

Yacob’s position is refreshing when compared to some Enlightenment figures, such as Kant (Herbjørnsrud 2017), but he was not a pioneer of this view of marriage. Some early Christian leaders had surprisingly progressive views on marriage, in contrast with the times in which they lived. John Chrysostom of the fourth century (Homily XX), asked rhetorically “what sort of pleasure will the husband himself enjoy, if he dwells with his wife as with a slave, and not as with a free-woman?” (Homily XX). He also said that a man should not raise his hand against his wife, nor insult, taunt, or deride her (Homily XX). Similarly, John Damascene of the eighth century said that husband and wife are “equal and without difference, neither prevails over the other” (Fount of Knowledge, 62). Although these statements are remarkably similar to those of Yacob, this is not to say that Yacob necessarily borrowed his views from either John Chrysostom (with whom he would have been familiar), or from John Damascene (whose work was written after Ethiopia was cut off from broader Christendom by the Muslim invasions of Africa). However, it does demonstrate that Yacob’s view of marriage was not an innovation; instead he was following the same trajectory as much earlier Christian commentary on the subject. Within Christianity, Yacob’s views were not new.

Even in medieval Europe, Yacob’s views would not have been a novelty. From the twelfth century onwards European women in Christendom had significant legal parity with their husbands. Judith Bennett, Karras, and McDougall (2013), note that marriages were not legal without the consent of both parties, and women had equal rights to divorce and separation, with divorce being granted on grounds of cruelty, adultery, or lack of consent. By the seventeenth century Europe had already established a lengthy tradition of historical proto-feminist thought, which drew strength from this medieval legislation. Many women writers were involved in this movement, including Christine de Pizan (1405), Laura Cereta (1488), Tullia de Aragona (1547), Jane Anger (1589), Moderata Fonte (1600), Constantia Munda (1617), Rachel Speght (1617), Ester Sowernam (1617), and Marie de Gournay (1622). Proto-feminist men included Giovanni Boccaccio (1360), Ludovico Ariosto (1516), Henricus Cornelius Agrippa (1529), who provocatively argued that women were superior to men, Thomas Elyot (1545), Jean Bodin (1576), who argued explicitly that no man should “make a slave of his wife”, and Richard Ferres (1622). Such writers, both women and men, expressed far more progressive and systematic commentary on women’s rights than Yacob.

Additionally, there is no evidence of Yacob as an active social reformer in favor of women’s rights. This is in direct contrast to Europe, where such activism had existed long before Yacob was born. Contemporary with Yacob, the 1649 Petition of Women in England was signed by 10,000 women and presented to the English Parliament. This petition insisted that women had equal right to the same political privileges as men, on the basis of “our creation in the image of God and of an interest in Christ equal to men”. The sheer number of signatories to this petition demonstrates the extent to which this concept of equal rights and political consciousness had become among women in seventeenth century England. The women who presented this position belonged to the Levellers, a group of English social reformers who agitated for a range of civil liberties including freedom of speech, freedom of association, and freedom of the press (Powell 208, 25), and who were radically egalitarian in their attitude to women. No such movement existed in seventeenth century Ethiopia, nor did Yacob attempt to start one.

Teodros (2005, 23), observes that “For seventeenth century Ethiopia, Zara Yacob’s views on gender equality were truly enlightened and extremely progressive”. Although this is true, Yacob’s views were not revolutionary when compared with Europe, where such views had been held for centuries, and where they had been developed far more systematically. Yacob may have been “the first to think about women’s rights in modern Ethiopia” (Teodros 2005, 24), but he was certainly not the first in the world to do so, and in contrast with his European predecessors and contemporaries, he did nothing to promote social reform. Contrary to Bonny (2017), there is no evidence that Yacob’s views “shaped the modern human rights movement” even in Ethiopia, let alone elsewhere.

The same situation prevails with regard to Yacob’s views on slavery. They are typically cited in very broad terms, as if Yacob condemned slavery in general; “condemned slavery” (Makonnen Alemayehu 2000, 11), “criticize[d] slavery” (Kimmerle 1995, 46), “proffered a moral condemnation of the slave trade” (Bonny 2018, 44). However, Chike Jeffers (2017, 130), notes specifically that “when he criticizes slavery, Zera Yacob is not talking about the transatlantic slave trade and the treatment of Africans by Europeans but rather his understanding of the precepts of Islam”. Teshome Abera (2016, 437), likewise states “Zara Yacob also refused Mohamed’s [sic] idea of slavery”. The reason why this distinction is significant is that it raises the question of why Yacob condemns the Muslim Arab slave trade while omitting any reference to the traditional Ethiopian slave trade. On the east coast of Africa, the Ethiopian empire was the largest and most influential slave trading power. Yacob must have been aware of this, especially since he refers explicitly to the fact that Hirut, the woman he married, was the slave of his own patron. His silence on the slavery and slave trade endorsed by enforced by the Christian majority in Ethiopia, is difficult to reconcile with the view that he held to a comprehensive condemnation of slavery.

While Yacob’s view on slavery is very humane in comparison with some Enlightenment philosophers, and was certainly a novelty in seventeenth century Ethiopia, it was not a pioneering position. Active protests against slavery and serfdom had existed in broader Christendom for over one thousand years (though generally as a minority report). In the fourth century Christian leader Gregory of Nyssa wrote a condemnation of the institution of slavery (Hart 2001; 51–69). His contemporary archbishop John Chrysostom also condemned slavery, telling his church members to buy slaves, set them free, and teach them a trade so they could support themselves (de Wet 2015). In the fifth century bishop Acacius of Amida collected his church’s silver and gold items, and sold them to raise money to buy and free war slaves (Greatrex and Lieu 2007, 43). Christian writers record and praise the actions of other Christians who liberated slaves by buying them and setting them free, even though other Christians saw no reason to free their slaves. Later social reformers of serfdom and slavery included the Englishman John Ball (1338–1381), the German peasant leader Sebastian Lotzer (born in 1490), the authors of the Memmingen Articles (1525), the Catholic priest Bartolom de las Casas (1484–1566), the sixteenth century Anabaptists and Radical Reformers, the English Levellers (1642–1651), and the Quakers, who started protesting slavery in 1657 and were instrumental in the gradual overturn of slavery laws in North America.

It is true that Yacob’s view on slavery is refreshingly different to the views of some Enlightenment figures, such as John Locke, David Hume, James Long, Immanuel Kant, and François-Marie Arouet Voltaire. However, other Enlightenment philosophers opposed slavery, such as Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Denis Diderot, Thomas Paine, and Charles-Louis Montesquieu. Yacob’s objection to slavery was certainly extraordinary in his time and place, given Ethiopia’s position as a major slave trading power. However, what sets Yacob apart from earlier and contemporary European protesters against slavery is his lack of activism against the slave trade. Apart from his egalitarian treatment of Hirut, there is no evidence that he made any effort to change the status of slaves in Ethiopia, or agitate for their liberation. He did not openly criticize the slave trade in his own nation, nor take any active steps to combat slavery, or encourage others to do so. This aligns him more with Enlightenment philosophers such as Thomas Jefferson, who repeatedly spoke out against slavery, but owned slaves and did nothing to end slavery.

Yacob as pre-emptor of Enlightenment philosophy

Herbjørnsrud (2017), credits Yacob with “many of the highest ideals of the later European Enlightenment”, and an “agnostic, secular, and enquiring method”, while Ibhawoh (2017), cites his Hatata as an “African Precursor to Enlightenment Liberalism”. Abera (2016), similarly describes Yacob as a “rationalist philosopher, who advocated reason as the critical resolver of disputes”, and Yirga Gelaw Woldeyes (2017, 274), says Yacob is “often praised for resembling Descartes in his rationality”. Yacob is specifically credited with pre-empting Enlightenment views on the existence of God, miracles, rationalism, and natural rights. To what extent did Yacob pre-empt the rationalism of the Enlightenment?

Did Yacob pre-empt Enlightenment skepticism about the existence of God? Herbjørnsrud (2017), attributes to Yacob “an openness towards atheistic thought”. Despite being one of Herbjørnsrud’s more restrained claims about Yacob, it is still vulnerable to some criticism, especially since the evidence Herbjørnsrud provides for Yacob’s “openness towards atheistic thought” is very slight.

Herbjørnsrud says “[Yacob’s] discussion of whether or not there is a God is more open-minded than Descartes’s”, and claims Yacob “incorporates existentialist perspectives”. He provides a quotation from Yacob’s treatise.

“Who is it that provided me with an ear to hear, who created me as a rational being and how have I come into this world? Where do I come from? Had I lived before the creator of the world, I would have known the beginning of my life and of the consciousness of myself. Who created me?”

This is all the evidence Herbjørnsrud presents for Yacob’s “openness towards atheistic thought”. This single paragraph is certainly not comparable to Descartes’ pages of existential reasoning and logical argumentation.

Herbjørnsrud does not provide this paragraph in its complete context, nor does he identify that he has started the quotation halfway through a sentence. Locating the paragraph in its original context, it is apparent that Yacob’s reflections on this matter were prompted while he was in the middle of prayer. As he was praying, he wondered if there was anyone listening.

“While I was praying in such and similar ways, one day I said to myself in my own thought: “Whom am I praying to or is there a God who listens to me?” At this thought I was invaded by a dreadful sadness and I said: “In vain have I kept my own heart pure” (as David says).” (chapter 3)

This is certainly indicative of theological doubt in the existence of God, however minimal and temporary. Like many others before him, Yacob interrupts his own prayer with the question of whether or not the God to whom he is praying actually exists. Yacob then responds to his own doubt by quoting the Bible, specifically the words of David, one of the early kings of Israel.

“Later on I thought of the words of the same David, “Is the inventor of the ear unable to hear?” and I said: “Who is it that provided me with an ear to hear, who created me as a rational [being] and how have I come into this world? Where do I come from? Had I lived before the creator of the world, I would have known the beginning of my life and of the consciousness [of myself]. Who created me?”

This provides the context for the words quoted by Herbjørnsrud. Rather than being the systematic expression of existential reflection, or a serious argument against the existence of God, these words of Yacob are in fact his way of addressing his previous doubts. In response to his question about whether or not there is a God who listens to his prayer, Yacob recalls the words of king David in the Bible, and reassures himself of God’s existence. He goes on to base a teleological argument for the existence of God, on the very words he has quoted from the Bible.

“Was I created by my own hands? But I did not exist before I was created. If I say that my father and my mother created me then I must search for the creator of my parents and of the parents of my parents until they arrive at the first who were not created as we [are], but who came into this world in some other way without being generated. For if they themselves have been created, I know nothing of their origin unless I say, “He who created them from nothing must be an uncreated essence who is and will be for all centuries [to come], the Lord and master of all things, without beginning or end, immutable, whose years cannot be numbered.””

Having reached the end of this chain of reasoning, Yacob concludes that God definitely exists, putting an end to his doubt.

“And I said “Therefore there is a creator, else there would have been no creation. This creator who endowed us with the gifts of intelligence and reason, can he himself be without them? For he created us as intelligent beings from the abundance of his intelligence and the same one being comprehends all, creates all, is almighty.”” (chapter 3)

Yacob reprises this argument in chapter 4.

“And I said: “I understand there is a creator, greater than all creatures; since from his overabundant greatness, he created things that are so great. He is intelligent who understands all, for he created us as intelligent from the abundance of his intelligence; and we ought to worship him, for he is the master of all things. If we pray to him, he will listen to us; for he is almighty.”” (chapter 4)

This constitutes the entirety of Yacob’s reflection on the existence of God; a brief moment of doubt during prayer, to which he responds by quoting the Bible and building a teleogical argument in favor of God’s existence. There is no evidence here for the “openness towards atheistic thought” attributed to Yacob by Herbjørnsrud. There is certainly nothing here comparable to Descartes’ struggle with skepticism.

When compared to his European peers, Yacob appears even less skeptical, and less open to atheism. During the seventeenth century a prevailing spirit of skeptical rationalism in Europe produced a number of outspoken atheists. The first was Lucilio Vanini (1585–1619), whose work De Admirandis Naturae Reginae Deaeque Mortalium Arcanis (1616), was an open declaration of systematic atheism. The anonymous treatise Theophrastus redivivus (c. 1650), cited atheists and skeptics throughout history, and built a systematic case against the existence of all gods and against the truth of all religions. Matthias Knutzen (1646–1674), wrote three pamphlets explicitly denying the supernatural, denying the truth of the Bible, and espousing complete atheism. The anonymous book Symbolum sapientiae (c. 1678), contains an agnostic atheism borrowed largely from the work of Baruch Spinoza, an earlier seventeenth century skeptic.Kazimierz Łyszczyński (1634–1689), explicitly denied the existence of God in his work De non-existentia Dei (On the Non-Existence of God). Pierre Bayle (1647–1706), was a French Protestant (Huguenot), who expressed tolerance for unorthodox beliefs and wrote a defense of atheism which convinced many that he was a crypto-atheist himself. Jean Meslier (1664–1729), expressed an atheistic materialism and argued all religions were false. There is nothing like any of this in Yacob’s writings. In comparison with these explicit declarations of systematic skepticism and even open atheism, Yacob’s occasional temporary doubts are quite insignificant.

Yacob was a devout believer in God, who criticized various aspects of Christianity, Judaism, and Islam, and had occasional doubts about the existence of God. He did not express any tolerance for atheism as a philosophy or atheists as people, nor did he attempt to make any systematic critique of belief in God or in religion generally. His occasional doubts were quickly dismissed by his firm belief in the existence of God, and in divine revelation through a combination of Scripture and nature. Consequently he cannot be regarded as a genuine precursor or pre-emptor of Enlightenment atheism.

Did Yacob pre-empt Enlightenment skepticism of miracles? Kiros (2017, 199), represents a common interpretation of Yacob’s approach to miracles, commenting “He proceeds to examine miracles and subjects them to a critical rational examination”. This sentiment is based largely on chapter 5 of Yacob’s treatise, in which he cites the fact that Christians appeal to miracles in order to validate their truth claims; “Again they said that the law of Christianity is from God, and miracles are brought forth to prove it” (Treatise of Zera Yacob, 5:33). Yacob refuses to accept this attempt at validation, on the basis that Christianity makes claims which he believes are contrary to nature.

At face value, this may seem to reflect a skepticism of miracles. However, an actual critical examination of miracles is completely absent from Yacob’s entire treatise. He actually never says that miracle stories themselves must be examined critically. On the contrary, he completely overlooks the issue of whether or not the miracles actually happened, and instead focuses on whether the religion’s teachings agree with what he understands God to have revealed through nature and reason. Not only does he never say miracle stories should be examined critically, Yacob never proposes a systematic critical analysis of miracles

This is unsurprising since Yacob never shows any personal skepticism of miracles at all.. On the contrary, his own words tell us that he uncritically accepted miracles which he believed happened in his own life. In the first chapter of his treatise, Yacob describes how once when he was a child, he was saved from death “by a miracle from God” (Treatise of Zera Yacob, 1:28–29). In chapter 17 Yacob describes how he prayed for God to punish one of his enemies, and he says his prayer was answered when the man was killed (Treatise of Zera Yacob, 17:14). In chapter 18 Yacob describes a famine which God inflicted on the land, as a punishment for sin (Treatise of Zera Yacob, 18:21). Yacob describes these three events as miracles caused by the direct intervention of God. He never expresses any skepticism towards them at all, nor does he ever express any skepticism towards any other miracles.

The contrast between Yacob’s unquestioning acceptance of these events as miracles, and a skeptical view of the same events, is made even clearer when it is contrasted with attitudes to miracles which were current in sixteenth century Europe, a full century before Yacob was writing. The Christian Reformation which began in the early fourteenth century (prompted by various reform movements of the previous century), counter-intuitively produced a skeptic movement, as early Reformers and later Protestants applied reason to Roman Catholic religious beliefs and miracle claims. As the two sides found themselves competing for customers in the same theological market, they created intellectual tools to test, disprove, and dismantle each other’s religious truth claims, and miracle stories were one of the first targets. Forcione (2017, 345), notes “the rationalist critique of miracles had in fact been adopted by numerous religious thinkers of the sixteenth century”.

Brown (206, 23), says “skepticism received its strongest encouragement from religious apologists who sought to demolish all claims to knowledge of their opponents in order to make way for their own views”. He cites several Protestants who used genuinely skeptical arguments against Catholic truth claims. This rush to critical examination of the religious and supernatural, actually contributed significantly to skepticism in folk beliefs such as witches and witchcraft, helping to put an end to the witch hunts. Brown (2011, 23), further notes that early seventeenth century “skepticism received its strongest encouragement from religious apologists who sought to demolish all claims to knowledge of their opponents in order to make way for their own views”. Brown cites the New Pyrrhonism (a skeptical sixteenth century philosophical movement), as well as various Protestants who used skeptical arguments against the miracle claims of Catholic authors, such as La Placette, Bouiller, and Chillingworth.

Even more remarkably, in the next century Englishman Lord Herbert of Cherbury wrote a lengthy systematic skeptical work which was a genuine precursor to David Hume’s argument against miracles. Cherbury’s work, published in 1645, is recognized by historians of philosophy to have completely anticipated Hume’s arguments, though Hume’s intellectual foundation differed from Cherbury’s, and his conclusions went further.

Yacob’s completely uncritical approach to miracles appears to have been overlooked by those commentators who view him as a rationalist skeptic. In contrast, Belayneh (2017, 50045) describes Yacob’s belief that he was saved by a miracle as “purely irrational”, asking “How is this conclusion different from that which he came to criticize later?”. Belayneh argues that Yacob’s uncritical acceptance of miracles is not only in stark contradiction to the rationalism which Yacob claimed to hold, but also differentiates him from genuine rationalists and skeptics such as David Hume.

Did Yacob pre-empt Enlightenment rationalism? Nearly 100 years before Yacob, in 1547 the famous Italian philosopher Tullia de Aragona wrote “I want you to bow to experience, which I trust by itself far more than all the reasons produced by the whole class of philosophers” (Dialogue on the Infinity of Love). However, Yacob does not demonstrate an equivalent attitude. An examination of Yacob’s rationale for his beliefs demonstrate that despite his best attempt at rationalist skepticism, most of his revolutionary views were in fact based on Christian beliefs rather than rationalism.

When criticizing the Catholic religious doctrine of celibacy, Yacob does not justify his view on the basis of his rationalist approach to ethics, but on the Bible. His words “we should not call them master and maidservant; for they are one flesh and one life” (Sumner 1976, 21), are taken directly from Genesis 1:23, in which husband and wife are described as one flesh.

Likewise, Yacob’s opposition to slavery is based explicitly on his belief that God created all humans as brothers; he says the Creator made all people like brothers, so all of them call God their Father. Again, Yacob justifies his view of the equality of all people by citing the creation of humans in the image of God, as described in Genesis 1:27.

Belayneh (2017), examines in detail the conflict between Yacob’s claim to be a rationalist skeptic, and his repeated profession of beliefs on a basis which is not rational. After surveying and criticizing the evidence other scholars have presented for Yacob’s apparent rationalism, Belayneh (2017, 50045), concludes “Zera Yacob is not a rationalist”. Belayneh also provides intriguing insight into the way that English translations of Yacob’s work, especially the translation of professor Claude Sumner, have led scholars astray by mistranslating words in Yacob’s text, making them sound like seventeenth century European Enlightenment terminology. He notes in particular the number of times that the word “reason” appears in Sumner’s English translation of Yacob’s treatise, noting that Sumner used it to translate several different words, none of which actually mean “reason”. Belayneh says “Terms like “Heart”, “conscience”, “intelligence”, and “mind”, “Think”, are translated as “reason”” , and adds “these terms mean different things”.

In comparison to the seventeenth century European rationalists, Yacob does not appear very rational at all. By the time Yacob was writing, there was already a well-developed rationalist movement in Europe, which practiced a far more skeptical attitude towards personal experiences, religious beliefs, and the existence of God.

Did Yacob pre-empt Enlightenment views of natural rights? On the contrary, Yacob’s views on natural rights are another reason why modern historians of philosophy differentiate Yacob from many of the Enlightenment philosophers who came later.

Like some other Christians of his era, Yacob derived ethics via a two stage process. The proximate source of ethics was nature, but the ultimate source of ethics was God, who communicated that knowledge through a natural order which He had ordained to reflect His ethics. Some Enlightenment philosophers (such as John Locke), also followed this two stage process, and in this regard Yacob agrees with Locke. In contrast, Enlightenment rationalists and skeptics such as Thomas Hobbes, who wrote in 1651, around fifteen years before Yacob, derived ethics via a one stage process; nature was both the proximate and ultimate source of ethics, and God was not considered at all.

The difference is made very obvious by a comparison of the American Declaration of Independence which derives human rights from God, and the French Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen just four years later, which derives human rights from nature alone. The Declaration of Independence (1776), says “We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights”. However, the Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen (1789), says “Men are born and remain free and equal in rights”, asserting human liberty as a natural right without reference to God. This break from deriving rights from God was a critical element in the distinctive thought of the Enlightenment. Thomas Hobbes believed true revelation must always be in harmony with human reason and experience, just as Yacob and Locke did. However, unlike Yacob and Locke, Hobbes believed human rights derived from nature, not God.

The concept of human rights which derived from nature, had already been developed in some detail during the medieval era. The earliest formulators of this concept were Gratianus, Odo of Dover, Rufinus, Simon of Bisignano, Sicardus of Cremona, Ricardus Anglicus, Alanus, Laurentius Hispanus, Vicentius Hispanus, Huguccio, and Hostiensis, all writing during the eleventh to thirteenth centuries. During the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, significant developments in natural human rights were made by Godfrey de Fontaines and Jean Charlier de Gerson.

Tierney (2001, 76) notes that the Enlightenment concept of rights in the seventeenth century was derived directly from a long chain of thought which originated in the concepts developed by these early medieval theorists, noting that the medieval writers were well known to sixteenth century Spanish jurists, who in turn influenced the human rights theorists of the seventeenth century. So in his approach to human rights and his approach to determining ethical principles Yacob shared views held by some Enlightenment philosophers, such as Locke, but he was not an innovator of this view; it had already been developed and written about by other people, long before he was born.

Although his views on the equality of wives and husbands, on the equality of all humans, on deriving ethics by reasoning from natural law, on testing religious truth claims, and on slavery, were all revolutionary in seventeenth century Ethiopia, these ideas had already been voiced many centuries before in Europe, where they had been developed to a far greater degree. Additionally, unlike the many European social reformers before him, Yacob was not an active reformer himself; he wasn’t even an active abolitionist of slavery, which he must have seen all around him, and for which his own ethnic group was largely responsible.

While praising Yacob’s more progressive views, Teodros (1994, 10), nevertheless acknowledges that Yacob was in various ways very much a product of his era, commenting “Consistent with the dominant prejudices of the age, his views of non-Christians, particularly Jews and Muslims were not positive”, and further noting “his strong belief in the power of Reason did not lead him to develop a politically fair principle of toleration”. As an example, Yacob’s enlightened view of women and marriage definitely had distinct limits. In one section of his work he says that if an individual discovers their faith has been based on falsehood, it will lead them to abandon their religious beliefs. Yacob illustrates the situation with the metaphor of a man who discovers his child is illegitimate due to his wife’s adultery, saying that if the man made this discovery, “he would be sad and would send her out with her child” (Sumner 1976, 12).

For Yacob therefore, the adultery of a wife is justification for the husband sending both his wife and child out of his house, to fend for themselves. This does not exhibit a particularly high regard for egalitarianism or for the rights of women. As Teodros (1994, 10), comments “If we evaluate his program by the yardsticks of modernity, there is much in his vision of the good life that many persons would find quite oppressive and very intolerant”.

Yacob’s relationship to colonialism

Zera Yacob’s relationship to colonialism is a matter of ongoing debate, with scholars aligned on two broad fronts; those for whom Yacob is an indigenous icon and tool for decolonialism, and those for whom Yacob is a perpetuator of Eurocentrism and colonial thought.

Scholars such as Teshome Abera (2016), Fasil Merawi (2017), Bonny Ibhawoh (2017), Teodros Kiros (2017), and Kush Fanikiso (2018), have all championed Yacob’s Hatata as an example of indigenous Ethiopian philosophy which is not only free from colonial contamination, but also valuable in the decolonization of Africana philosophy. These scholars belong to what Vest (2009, 13), has termed the “Excavationist School”, a historico-analytical approach which attempts to build a counter-narrative to European exceptionalism by digging through African history in search of African precedents to European achievements.

In particular, Fasil Merawi (2017, 8, 9), asserts “Zera Yacob’s philosophy contributes to this project of mental decolonization and selfaffirmation [sic] of Africans in a number of ways”, and further describes Yacob’s Hata as helpful in learning “the lessons of resisting Western cultural influence”.

However, not all Ethiopian scholars share this view. Some see no value in aligning Yacob with the Enlightenment, and even see Yacob himself as a symbol of European colonialism whose ethical system was antagonistic to indigenous Ethiopian values. Yirga Woldeyes (2017, 7) sees “the imitation of western laws and western education as instances of epistemic violence”. Consequently, Yirga (2017, 274), strongly objects to identifying Yacob with the Enlightenment, objecting that this “reflects our epistemological entanglement with Eurocentrism”. Yirga regards praise of Yacob’s rationalism and ethics as a misplaced adoration of European values. Rather than speaking with approval of the extent to which Yacob’s values align with Enlightenment and post-Enlightenment ethics, Yirga (2017, 274), disparagingly characterizing Yacob’s treatise as “a written rational African philosophy that gives primacy to reason over custom and praises justice, gender equality and individual freedom”.

Taking a similar approach, Vest (2009, 6), disagrees with analyzing Africana philosophy in terms of its relationship to European philosophy, writing “We must recognize European philosophy as neither universalizable nor as an appropriate normative model for African philosophy”. While recognizing the value of Teodros Kiros’ commentary on Zera Yacob, Vest (2009, 13), warns against “the Excavationist School”, whose efforts she believes are commendable in spirit but typically wrong in aims, and “motivated by a perverse preoccupation with Western claims that Africa lacked civilization”.

Conclusion

Insofar as Yacob departed from or challenged the ethical values and social conventions of his day, he typically did not do so on the basis of the rationalist skepticism distinctive to the Enlightenment. Rather, Yacob’s philosophical and moral innovations were based typically on either his understanding of the Bible, or resulted from the religious skepticism of the active disputes in the qene school in which he was taught. Belayneh Girma (2017), is therefore right to differentiate Yacob from the Enlightenment. Yacob did not share the distinctive rationalism and skepticism of the Enlightenment era, nor the specific egalitarian and tolerant ethical values which European Enlightenment figures developed.

So where does Yacob really stand in relation to the Enlightenment? On the basis of the assessment made here, he stands in parallel to it. Chike Jeffers (2017, 130), similarly describes Yacob as orthogonal to the Enlightenment, saying “There is a sense in which Locke and Descartes share a modernity that Zera Yacob does not, a point that need not lead us to deny that Zera Yacob is a modern philosopher but rather to say that he inhabits a different modernity”. The European Enlightenment philosophers built their ideas on the basis of a lengthy tradition of European thought which was well over one thousand years old, and which received no contribution from Ethiopian philosophy in general, or Zera Yacob in particular.

There is much to be said for Yirga’s (2017, 274), preference for “elaborating Zara Yacob’s thought within the context of his epistemological tradition and the social practice of his time”. Yacob’s greatest value is found in his relationship to his own society and culture, rather than the extent to which he is similar to any others. His philosophical commentary has intrinsic value independent of its relationship to the European Enlightenment. He gains nothing from comparison with it, and loses nothing by his independence from it.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=18B2sBehQGQ&list=PLaIlT40doR9D6CMTmFOXrQ-MyAj0Iw-ea&index=1

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